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6.1  Introduction 
The subject  of  this  paper  is the divergence between  the policies 
towards East-West trade of the United States on the one hand and its 
Western European allies on the other. The most striking differences 
are in their willingness to use the trade embargo as a means of exerting 
political pressure, and in the extent to which they believe it is possible 
or sensible to limit the export of high-technology goods to the East, 
but even a casual study of the history of East-West trade since 1945 
shows that the differences go rather deep. Both the Eastern bloc and 
Western Europe have recognised  the existence of  linkages between 
trade and political relations but have been resistant to direct or explicit 
use  of  trade policy as a political tool; while the United  States has, 
generally, maintained a more skeptical stance about the positive link- 
ages and has exhibited a greater willingness to use trade embargoes as 
a political weapon. 
In the first part of this paper I sketch the main features of East-West 
trade in the past 35 years and the differences in  Western attitudes to 
it. I draw a distinction between two related views of the connection 
between trade and political relations, which I label the “linkage”  and 
the “leverage”  views. The relevance to East-West trade of the received 
wisdom on the effectiveness of trade embargoes is reviewed. The need 
to take explicit account of expectations of future policy is the key theme 
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of the paper, and I argue that the United States may have attained the 
worst  of  all  possible  worlds  by  acquiring a reputation  for imposing 
ineffective embargoes. 
The second part of the paper is devoted to aformal model that focuses 
on the role of expectations in shaping the investment behavior of mul- 
tinational  corporations  and  therefore  on their exposure to embargo 
threats. 
6.2  East-West Trade: Linkage, Leverage, and Expectations 
6.2.1 
It is beyond the scope of  this paper to give a systematic historical 
account of 40 years of East-West trade. The sketch below is based on 
Becker (1983), Cooper (1987), Rode and Jacobsen (1985), and Stent 
(1981). 
The divergence in the views of the United States and most Western 
European countries on East-West trade goes back to the early 1950s 
when trade relations between the United States and the Soviet Union 
were minimal, the basis of trade policy being that trading with an enemy 
should be minimized. The Export Control Act of  1949 and the later 
Export Administration Acts regulated trade in strategically important 
goods; and on the principle that all trade strengthens the economy, the 
presumption in  the early years seems to have been that all potential 
exports were strategically  important unless demonstrated not to be. 
The U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951 provided the 
basis for harmonized actions by the NATO nations and Japan on export 
controls, and the Paris-based “Coordinating Committee”  (COCOM) 
drew up the lists of restricted exports. 
There is a distinction in principle to be made between trade restric- 
tions imposed for reasons of strategic defense policy, and those imposed 
from broader motives of foreign policy. There has been a greater con- 
cordance of views between the United States and the Europeans on 
the former than on the latter, but in practice, as the previous paragraph 
indicates, the distinction between the two motives becomes fuzzy, and 
from the earliest years there were conflicts between the U.S. and its 
allies on the  stringency with  which COCOM restrictions  should be 
applied. 
One important case was the 1962-63 pipeline embargo, described in 
some detail by  Stent (1981), which  in fact  was  imposed  under  the 
auspices of NATO  rather than COCOM. This embargo was rendered 
ineffective by the refusal of Britain and Italy to participate, a refusal 
which may have been partly influenced by the suspicion that the em- 
bargo was motivated more by the desire to protect U.S. oil companies 
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against the alleged dumping of  Soviet oil on world  markets than by 
strategic defense considerations.  West Germany initially backed  the 
embargo but later withdrew  its support. The fate of this embargo is 
symptomatic of  a general tendency for American embargoes on stra- 
tegic materials to be gradually slackened in the light of the availability 
to the Soviet bloc of alternative sources of supply in Western Europe, 
as European nations have been more permissive than the United States. 
The differences between the NATO allies on East-West trade seemed 
to be eliminated in the early 1970s with the Nixon-Kissinger pursuit of 
detente in  the United  States and Willy  Brandt’s Ostpolitik in West 
Germany. The economic effects of trade were now not seen as a dan- 
gerous strengthening of an adversary, but as the incentives to coexis- 
tence and political liberalization. Agreements between the United States 
and the Soviet Union granted the latter most-favored-nation  status as 
well as trade credits. The process quickly ran into difficulties with the 
U.S legislature, as the Jackson-Vanik amendment tied the granting of 
most-favored-nation status to  the liberalization of Soviet policy towards 
Jewish emigration, and the Stevenson amendment restricted ExIm bank 
credits. 
The Soviet Union  withdrew  from  the agreement, complaining  of 
improper  interference  in  its internal  affairs.  The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979 brought the process of detente to an end: the Carter 
administration reacting by imposing an embargo on trade in grain and 
in fertilizer. (An interesting feature of the fertilizer embargo was that 
the Soviet Union maintained the deliveries of  materials that they had 
agreed to supply in exchange for super-phosphate  fertilizer even though 
the Occidental corporation was legally barred from delivering the fer- 
tilizer.) Meanwhile, the process of dCtente seemed much smoother for 
the Western  Europeans and an agreement had been  reached  for the 
supply of  pipes and compressors, mainly by  West Germany, for the 
new Urengoi gas pipeline in exchange for natural gas. 
The Reagan administration removed the grain and fertilizer embargo, 
but  the worsening political  situation in Poland led  the Americans  to 
seek a tightening of trade in strategic goods, and in particular an end 
to the pipeline deal. (The possibility of forcing Poland into default on 
its huge foreign debts was evidently seriously considered and argued 
over within  the American  administration,  but  rejected  primarily  be- 
cause of the dangerous implications for the Western banking system.) 
Since direct American participation in the pipeline had been eliminated 
in  1979, and since the Western European countries were opposed to 
the abrogation of the pipeline agreement, the Americans attempted to 
enforce the embargo by exerting extraterritorial pressure on the foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. corporations such as Dresser-France and the for- 
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of the U.K. Both the British and the French had laws aimed at pre- 
venting the exercise of such authority by a foreign government. The 
resulting conflict was eventually resolved in late 1982 with an agreement 
by which the Western Europeans continued with the pipeline deal but 
agreed to tighten up COCOM restrictions on strategic goods. Subse- 
quent remarks by the French president, however, suggested that the 
agreement represented a unilateral climbdown by the United States. 
The persistent divergence in attitudes to East-West trade has to be 
seen in the light of the differing economic importance of  trade to the 
different parties. Table 6.1 shows that quantitatively East-West trade 
is more significant to Western Europe than to the United States (and 
of more significance to the East than to the West). Thus the Europeans 
have more to lose from trade disruption than do the Americans.  It 
would be futile to attempt to disentangle cause from effect in the in- 
teractions between the politics and economics of  trade. It would cer- 
tainly  be  a  gross  oversimplification  to say  that  Western  European 
policymaking has been dominated by considerations of economic self- 
interest, while the Americans have, by reason of lack of direct economic 
involvement, been free to pursue purely political objectives, for it is 
clear from even the abbreviated narrative above that considerations of 
economic self-interest have entered into American  decision making, 
while Western European policy has been influenced by political as well 
as economic considerations. 
Table 6.1  East-West Trade in 1980 
East-West Trade in  1980 
~  ~_______ 
U.S.  EEC  FRG  France 
Volume ($b)  5.28  56.8  23.8  10.21 
Share of  trade  1.14  4.14  6.2  4.2 
Share of GNP  0.2  2.0  2.9  1.58 
Eastern Trade with OECD 
USSR  CMEA-6  CMEA-Europe 
Volume ($b)  46.4  39.1  85.5 
Share of GNP  3.4  6.2  4.2 
Source: Guillaume (1983). 
Nch-t CMEA-6 refers to the six Eastern European countries excluding the USSR;  CMEA- 
Europe are the CMEA-6 plus the  USSR; OECD is  the Organization for  Economic 
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6.2.2  Linkage and Leverage 
The concept of ‘‘linkage’’ between international economic and po- 
litical relations was at the heart of the American dCtente policy of the 
1970s as of the West German Ostpolitik. It also seems to provide an 
underpinning of Soviet trade policy. 
Linkage can mean  several different  things.  One general sense in 
which there can be linkage is that global trade liberalization can reduce 
the scope for conflicts over access to markets or to raw materials. Of 
more relevance to East-West trade is the idea that as trade is mutually 
beneficial, the building of trade relations gives each party a stronger 
incentive to avoid conflict. 
More specifically, some have argued that East-West trade will bring 
concrete political gains for the West: citizens of Eastern bloc countries 
are exposed to Western influences as consumers of Western goods or 
users of  Western technology;  the  Eastern  Clite is exposed more  to 
Western contacts and ideas; and communist planners, faced by  the 
incentives arising from foreign prices, are led to liberalize their methods 
of economic management. Further, it seems that the Soviet Union has 
seen trading links with the West as an important component of “peace- 
ful coexistence,” and as a step toward one of their major foreign policy 
aims-Western  acceptance of the post-war status quo in Europe and 
of the Soviet position as a super-power equal to the United States. 
A still more specific form of linkage is when trade seems to be made 
conditional on political progress, as with the relaxation of restrictions 
on the emigration of  Jews from the Soviet Union in the early  1970s 
and of  Germans from East to West Germany in the same period. The 
Soviet Union was evidently content that such liberalization was seen 
as intimately linked with progress on other aspects of dCtente, but most 
decidedly was not willing to have the linkage made explicit and ex- 
plicitly conditional by the Jackson-Vanik amendment. 
This  serves to make  the point  that the line between  linkage and 
leverage is not easily  drawn, especially  where  the latter concept is 
taken to refer to the use  of  economic pressures  to achieve specific 
political goals, a trade embargo being the prime example of leverage. 
Bayard, Pelzman, and Perez-Lopez (1983) provide a good survey of 
the general questions which arise in  the analysis of  trade embargoes. 
The attractiveness of an embargo depends on the relative costs which 
it imposes on the parties involved. The costs will be greater, the greater 
the  share of  a country’s income derives from the embargoed  trade. 
Table 6.1 above therefore can be taken as providing an explanation for 
the apparent attractiveness to the United States of  trade restrictions 
as a political lever. Perhaps more important than trade shares, however, 
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trade, for the gains from trade are greater the smaller is the price- 
elasticity of trade. In this sense the Soviet Union may well seem vul- 
nerable  to embargo threats,  for it  cannot  easily  find  an alternative 
market for natural gas to Western Europe, nor alternative suppliers for 
pipeline equipment or other technologically advanced goods. 
The question of substitutability is central to the evaluation of COCOM 
restrictions. If  the Soviet Union can easily shift resources from non- 
military to military uses, then only a general embargo aimed at damaging 
the entire economy would provide an effective restraint on Soviet mil- 
itary capacity, and such a policy now has few supporters. The greater 
are the restrictions on the ability of the economy to shift resources from 
one sector to another the more one can justify an embargo limited to 
particular strategic goods. Thus, although the use in Afghanistan of trucks 
from the Kama River plant, built with American assistance, was polit- 
ically embarrassing to the United States, it is arguable that the real mil- 
itary situation would have been no different if there had been no Western 
involvement in Kama River. By  contrast, export restrictions on “su- 
permini”  computers, imperfect though the restrictions are in practice, 
probably do have significant effects on the Soviet Union. 
The importance of substitution elasticities to the cost of an embargo 
implies that an embargo is less likely to be successful the longer the 
time period under consideration, for in the long run, substitution pos- 
sibilities are enhanced and elasticities increased. 
Bayard et al. identify cartel problems as a critical factor in the success 
of embargoes. The more countries join in an embargo the greater will 
be the share of the embargoed country’s trade affected and the harder 
it will be to find substitute markets and suppliers. However, the more 
successful an embargo, the greater will be the profits to breaking the 
embargo. The policing of an embargo may therefore be critical to its 
success, and embargoes of trade in widely traded “anonymous” goods 
such as grain  and oil  are less likely to be  successful than,  say, an 
embargo on the export of supercomputers. On this basis one can justify 
the Reagan  administration’s removal  of  the grain  embargo  and  at- 
tempted imposition of  a pipeline embargo; though from the point  of 
view of gathering political support in Western Europe, the policy com- 
bination may have been less than ideal. 
These arguments are based on a view of markets as being sufficiently 
competitive for prices  to be  close to marginal cost.  In  imperfectly 
competitive markets, price may often be significantly above marginal 
cost. This raises the possibility that an embargo will have the extra 
cost for the embargoing nation of eliminating trade on which abnormal 
profits were being made, and in the case of high-technology trade this 
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fluence  the  behavior  of  individual  firms,  including  their  lobbying 
behavior. 
All of the analysis above confirms the view expressed in the 1983 
report made by the U.S. Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment, 
which observes that 
there are severe constraints on the power of  U.S.  licensing to deny 
the Soviet  Union access to the  Western technology it  most wants. 
These constraints include the extent to which the Soviets use illegal 
means to acquire Western technology, lack of allied agreement on a 
more  strenuous multilateral  export control policy,  the difficulties 
inherent in identifying in advance which technologies will have im- 
portant military payoffs, and the increasing worldwide diffusion of 
technology.  While existing export criteria could certainly be tight- 
ened, it is most improbable that even drastic changes in U.S.  export 
control policy could alter the fact thut the USSR benejits militarily 
from Western technology. Moreover, it is rare to find examples of 
technologies obtained from the West which the USSR could not have 
produced itself, albeit with delays. (Pp. 11 -  12, emphasis in original.) 
Finally, the difficulties  of  making  an empirical assessment of  the 
effectiveness of  embargoes should  be noted. There was clearly  no 
prospect whatsoever that the  1979  grain embargo would  induce the 
Soviet Union to  withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan, but that 
leaves open the possibility  that its future behavior in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere could be affected. Also, an embargo may be the most ef- 
fective means available of making a strong moral statement (though an 
embargo that was known to be both wholly costless and wholly inef- 
fective presumably could have no value as a moral statement). 
6.2.3  Reputations and Expectations 
The Office of Technology Assessment report goes on to observe (in 
the context of extraterritorial  and retroactive sanctions)  that “sanctions 
may well have a long-term adverse effect on the U.S.  reputation as a 
dependable business partner in countries other than the USSR”  (59), 
but there is another sense in which the reputation of the United States 
matters. In the long run, as we saw above, a country has better op- 
portunities to avoid the effects of an embargo. It can do even better if 
it can anticipate the imposition of an embargo. Perfect anticipation is 
an unattainable objective, but any trading nation must make assess- 
ments of the likelihood of future trade disruption by an embargo. 
Thus when Hanson (1983) reports that the Soviet trade statistics in 
the  1970s  seem to show a deliberate attempt to reduce reliance  on 
Western technology but no attempt to restrain grain imports, one inter- 
pretation that can be offered  (in addition to the reasons offered  by 160  Alasdair Smith 
Hanson) is that Soviet policymakers may have been concerned about 
future attempts by the United States to use trade as a political lever 
and felt that their  exposure to leverage  was greater in  the  case of 
technology imports than in the case of grain. 
At first sight there is a contradiction in what one can oversimplify 
as the Western European position of being enthusiastic about linkage 
and unenthusiastic about leverage, for apparently these are two sides 
of  the  same coin.  The gains from trade will  be  greater when  trade 
shares are greater, when elasticities are larger, and when there are no 
alternative trading partners, so the circumstances in which economic 
relations create a strong interest in the maintenance of good political 
relations between the trading parties seem to be precisely the circum- 
stances in which a trade embargo will be effective. But this is to miss 
an essential difference between the two cases: linkage will be  more 
successful, the greater the extent to which the trading partners’ ex- 
pectations are fulfilled; leverage will be more successful the greater the 
extent to which expectations are disappointed. 
On this interpretation, the difference between the United States on 
the one hand and the Europeans, both Western and Eastern, on the 
other, is not that one gives priority to political over economic consid- 
erations, but that the political and economic priorities of the Europeans 
call for settled and growing economic relations between East and West, 
while the Americans see dangers in this policy and attractions to the 
use of economic pressure for the attainment of specific political ends. 
The obvious conflict between linkage and leverage makes for diffi- 
culties for both positions. The American concern that West Germany 
may be making itself too dependent on Soviet energy would be taken 
more seriously if it had been more consistently expressed, but there is 
scope for genuine concern that West Germany would be vulnerable to 
a shift in  Soviet policy in which the Soviet Union embraced a policy 
of leverage towards the Western nations, it having shown no reluctance 
to use leverage towards its allies and former allies (see Daoudi and 
Dajani 1983, chap. 4). American concern that investment by U.S. mul- 
tinationals in the Soviet Union would give a hostage to future Soviet 
pressure is less credible: it is hard to envisage circumstances in which 
an American administration would make serious political concessions 
to the Soviet Union because of a threat to expropriate American assets 
in the Soviet Union. 
The Soviet reaction  to the Jackson-Vanik amendment  and  to the 
superphosphate embargo can be interpreted as a clear statement of the 
Soviet Union’s desire (and interest) that trade relations should involve 
linkage and not leverage, and in the superphosphate case, an indicator 
of its belief that the embargo would be ineffective and short-lived. But 
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trade relations strengthens the Soviet Union’s  position should it reverse 
its policy. 
It is, however, for the American position that the conflicting needs 
of linkage and leverage pose the severest difficulties. For the embargo 
weapon to be most effective, it  should be a weapon deployed by a 
country with a reputation for not deploying it. For linkage to be effec- 
tive, a country might want to bind itself to a policy of eschewing the 
embargo  weapon  even  when  it  was  tempted  to use  it-a  “time- 
inconsistent”  policy,  in  the current jargon.  It is hard to escape the 
conclusion that the United States has contrived to attain the worst of 
all possible worlds by its apparent willingness to try to use economic 
leverage frequently, in circumstances when it did not have the support 
of its allies, and when for other reasons the leverage seemed unlikely 
to be effective. 
6.2.4  The Role of Multinational Corporations 
The issue of  the extraterritorial reach of  American law  over the 
foreign subsidiaries  of American multinationals  was at the center of 
the 1981-82  pipeline dispute with Western Europe. There is also the 
more general issue of how the activities of multinational corporations 
may be influenced  by  expectations of government behavior.  Vernon 
(1971, chap. 7) reports that the desire to  avoid government control over 
foreign activities is an important incentive for the multinationalization 
of economic activity. 
The prevalent theory of the multinational corporation (see Dunning 
1979, or Ethier 1983, for example) is based on the ownership-location- 
internalization paradigm, and sees multinationality as the outcome of 
a decision by a firm to establish a foreign subsidiary  rather than to 
supply a foreign market from exported home-country production or to 
license the firm’s technological knowledge to independent foreign pro- 
ducers. The decision not to export implies the balance of  advantage 
lies in overseas location of production; the fact that overseas firms have 
not already taken over the market implies  that the foreign firm  has 
some ownership advantages such as superior technological knowledge; 
and the decision not to exploit the ownership advantage by licensing 
implies an advantage to internal as opposed to market transactions. 
Multinationality  may  therefore provide a  most important channel 
through which expectations of future policy  and reputations of gov- 
ernments change the effectiveness of economic leverage. The estab- 
lishment of a foreign subsidiary, or even the licensing of technology to 
an independent foreign firm, may not wholly remove a firm’s foreign 
transactions from the extraterritorial reach of its home government, 
but it certainly greatly reduces the power of the home government over 
the firm’s activities. A potential multinational, faced by choices of how 162  Alasdair Smith 
to conduct activities that might be the subject of future embargoes and 
by a government with a reputation for frequent use of economic policy 
as a political lever may well find that these factors influence it to change 
its behavior in ways that have the effect of reducing the power of  the 
government to exercise leverage. 
The rest of this paper is devoted to aformal model of a multinational’s 
investment decisions, which emphasises the fact that, in more than one 
respect, investment is a strategic forward-looking decision, and iden- 
tifies the policy implications of this fact. 
6.3  A Model of  Multinational Investment 
6.3.1  The Model 
In the model of the multinational corporation presented  here, the 
principal focus is on how a foreign firm operating in a host  market 
might choose to become a multinational rather than export its product, 
and how this choice might be influenced by government policy. The 
same model is used in Smith (1987) to discuss the role of foreign direct 
investment as a strategic entry deterrent, and to analyze the effects of 
tariffs on foreign direct investment. 
The model offers an extremely simple characterization of the tech- 
nological advantage that a multinational firm may possess over a host- 
country rival: in order to make production possible, a new entrant must 
incur a firm-specific fixed cost in addition to the plant-specific fixed 
cost associated  with  the  establishment  of  a plant  in  any  particular 
location; while the multinational has already sunk the firm-specific cost. 
This characterisation of multinationality has its origins in the work of 
Hirsch (1976). A dynamic version is presented by Horstmann and Mar- 
kusen (1987) whose central objective is the analysis of the strategic 
timing of investment in a growing market by a multinational faced by 
potential competition from host-country rivals. The model in this paper 
does not have this dynamic aspect, and as a result is somewhat simpler 
than that of Horstmann and Markusen. 
In its home country the multinational has a plant where it has incurred 
a firm-specific sunk cost F  and a plant-specific sunk cost G. It produces 
output at constant average variable cost c. If it exports its output to 
the host country, a constant transport cost of s per unit and a tariff of 
t per unit must also be paid. If it establishes a plant in the host country, 
it must incur the plant-specific fixed cost G, but not the firm-specific 
fixed cost F,  and the marginal cost of output in this plant will also be 
constant and equal to c. The multinational chooses between exporting 
and foreign direct investment by comparing the cost of  establishing a 
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A host-country firm may also enter production of the good. It must, 
however, incur both the plant-specific fixed cost G and the firm-specific 
fixed cost F before it can produce, but when these costs have been 
incurred, it can produce at the same constant marginal  cost as the 
multinational.  (In fact, it would make  very little difference to allow 
cost differences between the firms.) One can think of the firm-specific 
fixed cost as  the cost of R & D required to gain access to the technology 
for producing the good, and any firm that has incurred it is as efficient 
as any other firm. This is admittedly a very crude characterization of 
R & D. 
The host country market for the good is described by a concave 
revenue function P(X)X,  and it will be assumed that the properties of 
this function are such that the multinational always finds it profitable 
to supply the host market, whether or not it faces a rival firm. 
Some limitations of the model should be noted. The possibilities that 
the host-country firm, if  it enters production, will then export to the 
multinational’s home market or even will itself become a multinational 
by  establishing a plant  in  the multinational’s  home country are not 
considered here. Also, there is only one multinational and only one 
potential host-country rival in the market. 
Perhaps the most serious limitation of the model is the fact that it 
does not address the internalization issue-the  question of which trans- 
actions are undertaken within firms and which in the market. As a 
consequence, there is no consideration of the possibility of the mul- 
tinational’s licensing its technological know-how to independent foreign 
firms as  an alternative to foreign direct investment. From the viewpoint 
of trade embargoes, however, licensing and foreign direct investment 
have  rather similar effects, and the model could be reinterpreted as 
one of the choice between licensing and exporting. But if one wanted 
seriously to address the possibility of embargoes being extended ex- 
traterritorially to  the behavior of subsidiaries of multinationals, it would 
be desirable to  treat licensing separately, as a potential way of escaping 
the effects of such embargoes. 
Finally, note that for the sake of simplicity  of terminology, I refer 
throughout to the foreign firm  as  “the  multinational”  even though 
strictly speaking it is only a potential multinational. 
6.3.2  The Multinational as Monopolist 
If the multinational faced no threat of competition, it could export 
and would  choose the export level  X, which  maximizes  P(X)X - 
(c+s+t)X.  Alternatively,  it could invest in  the host country and it 
would then choose the output level X, to maximize P(X)X - CX - 
G. These choices are illustrated in figure 6.1, from which it is imme- 
diately evident that, because of the concavity of  P(X)X,  X, < X,. 164  Alasdair Smith 
I  (c+s +  t  x 
Fig. 6.1  The multinational monopolist 
The firm will choose foreign direct investment rather than exporting 
if  and only if 
(1)  P(XH)X, - cX, - G > P(X,)X,  -  (c+s+I)XE  , 
and the choice is influenced by the balance between  G and (s+t)X. 
Specifically, as is clear from figure 6.1 or from the definitions of the 
two optimal output levels, a sufficient condition for exporting to be the 
preferred option is that G L (s +  t)XH,  while a sufficient condition for 
direct investment to be superior is that G 5 (s+f)XE. 
6.3.3  The Multinational as Duopolist 
If there is potential entry from a single domestic producer, the model 
now takes the form  of  a  multistage  game. In the initial  stages, the 
multinational decides whether to sell, and, if  so, whether to export or 
to invest, while the domestic firm decides whether to enter. For the 
moment, let us not identify the order in which the different firms’ entry 
decisions are made. At the final stage of the game the firms compete, 
if  both have entered, and output levels get determined. I assume that 
the decisions at earlier stages of the game are made in the knowledge 
of the equilibria of later stages, so the equilibrium is perfect. 
The equilibrium is solved by working backwards. In the event that 
the domestic firm does not enter, we know from the previous section 
what are the payoffs to  the alternative  actions open to the multinational. 
If  both firms enter the market, I  assume that they act as Cournot 
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of the other firm as given in choosing its own output level. It should 
be noted that an implication of the analysis of Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1984) is that the results will not be robust, at least in detail, to changes 
in this assumption about the nature of the competitive interaction at 
this  stage of  the game. If  the multinational  supplies the market by 
exporting, then, indicating the host country firm by the subscript 1 and 
the multinational  by the subscript 2, the respective  objectives of  the 
firms are independent of  the now-sunk costs and can be written 
max P(X, + X,)X, - cX, , 
max P(X, + X,)X, -  (c+s+f)X2  , 
Xl  (2) 
x2 
while, when the multinational  has established a plant, the objectives 
are the same but with s  + t  = 0. 
In figure 6.2, the interaction between the two firms in the post-entry 
game is represented by the two reaction  curves which  describe the 
optimal output of each firm as a function of its rival’s output. If  we 
suppose only that the demand function P(X, + X,) is sufficiently well 
behaved so that the reaction curves slope and cross in the way shown 
in figure 6.2, then it is easily shown that an increase in s +  f moves the 
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multinational’s reaction curve in to the left, and the equilibria in both 
situations are as illustrated  in  figure 6.2.  The presence of transport 
costs and tariffs drives the equilibrium away from the symmetric duopo- 
ly solution (X,,,,,XHH),  to a lower level of sales X,, for the exporting 
firm, and a higher level of output X,,  for the host country firm. It is 
easily seen also that the variable profits of the host country firm are 
higher  and of  the multinational  lower when the multinational  is an 
exporter than when it is a direct investor. It is also obvious that a firm 
will make greater profits as a monopolist than as a duopolist. 
Note how the choice between exporting and investing is different in 
duopoly from in monopoly. A monopolist simply compares the fixed 
cost of investment with the transport and tax costs of exporting. A 
duopolist, whose output level, other things equal, is less than that of 
a monopolist, might be expected to  be more likely to  choose the export 
option. But this is to ignore the strategic value of making the fixed 
investment which lowers variable unit cost by s  +  t, and thereby, with 
Cournot competition, expands the multinational’s  output and profit 
while contracting its rival’s output. 
6.3.4  Embargo Threats and Entry Decisions 
In applying this model  to the analysis  of  U.S.-European trade, I 
make the apparently eccentric assumption that Europe, both East and 
West, is to be treated as  one  country, with the U.S. as  the other country. 
The  justification for this structure is that it is simple but also sufficient 
to illustrate the essential points about the effects of multinationality on 
the effectiveness of embargoes. 
1 assume that an embargo can only be effective if the multinational 
has chosen to export; that, in other words, the actions of foreign sub- 
sidiaries are beyond the reach of the multinational’s home government. 
This is a very considerable narrowing of the focus of the model, and 
restricting of the potential effectiveness  of an embargo, and this feature 
of the model is justified also precisely  in order to focus attention on 
the way that multinationality may reduce the effectiveness of embargoes. 
The assumption that the multinational can make positive profits as 
an exporter, so that it will never choose to stay out of the host-country 
market, means that, in the absence of an embargo, the multinational 
must choose between exporting and investing, while the host country 
chooses between entering and not entering. However, an embargo could 
exclude the multinational from the market. The payoffs to the various 
decisions derive from the Cournot equilibria of the post-entry games 
discussed in the previous section and are set out in table 6.2, where H 
is the host country firm, M  the (potential) multinational, and in each 
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Table 6.2  The Entry Game 
H 
Not Enter  Enter 
Export  A, 0  CE,CH -  F -  G 
M  Invest  B-G,  0  D-G,  D-F-G 
Excluded  0,o  0, B-F-G 
We have assumed that CE  > 0 and we know that B >A > CE  and that 
An embargo will, by assumption, have no effect if the multinational 
has chosen to invest. If, however,  it has chosen to export, then an 
embargo will move it down to the “excluded”  row in table 6.2. But 
insofar as an embargo is anticipated, it changes the payoffs to invest- 
ment by the multinational,  reducing the expected values of A  and of 
CE  towards zero. It also raises the expected value of CH  towards D, 
but the host country firm can always enter after the imposition of  an 
embargo, so it need only concern itself with the effect of the anticipation 
of an embargo on the behavior of the multinational. 
The effect of an embargo will depend on which equilibrium is chosen 
and unfortunately the above inequalities are not sufficient to narrow 
down greatly the range of possible equilibria. I shall here consider only 
some of  the possibilities. 
It is natural to model firms’ entry decisions as being sequential, and 
it is important, in doing this, to observe that only a decision to sink 
entry costs-investment  by M, entry by  H-is  an irreversible com- 
mitment. A decision by M to export or by H not to enter is a decision 
which could be reversed after the rival firm has made its entry decision, 
and as we have noted above, a decision by H  not to enter could be 
reversed after an embargo is imposed on exports by M.  For more formal 
analysis of sequential decision making in this model, see Smith (1987). 
Strategic Foreign Direct Investment 
Suppose that M  makes its  entry decision  first, and suppose that 
(B>)CH>F+G>D  so that H will enter only if  M  is an exporter or is 
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excluded. Suppose also that C,>D -  G and A>B -  G, so that simple 
comparison of the costs of exporting with the costs of foreign direct 
investment would indicate that M  should export, whatever action is 
taken by H.  In this case, it is actually optimal for M to invest, because 
by doing so it will ensure that H chooses not to enter. 
This example illustrates the potential strategic role of foreign direct 
investment as an entry-deterrent in this kind of  model, to add to its 
role in strengthening oligopolistic power discussed at the end of section 
6.3.3.  Thus, a multinational may have strategic incentives to undertake 
foreign direct investment even when cost comparisons do not seem to 
justify such a policy, and in this event it puts itself beyond the reach 
of an embargo independently of the embargo threat itself. 
Embargo-Induced Foreign Direct Investment 
In the event that F+G>C,>D,  H  will  choose not to enter if  M  is 
not excluded, whether or not it makes its entry decision before M.  If 
B-G>A,  then M  will undertake foreign direct investment, and the 
embargo has no effect. If, on the other hand, A>B -  G in the absence 
of embargo threats, M would choose to be an exporter. The threat of 
an embargo, however, may reduce the expected value ofA below B -  G, 
in which case M  will be induced by the threat of  embargo to invest, 
and thereby make the embargo ineffective. 
Entry in Response to Embargo 
Continuing with the previous case, suppose that the embargo threat 
is not perceived by M to be sufficiently strong to reduce A below B -  G, 
so that M is a monopoly exporter. It does not follow that an embargo 
will  be  effective, for once M  is excluded from the market, H  faces 
returns of B-F-G  from entry, and it will enter if this is positive. 
An Effective Embargo 
It follows, then, that an embargo will be effective only if  the fixed 
costs F+  G of entry by H are higher than the profits B that it can make 
as a monopolist, if the fixed costs G of  foreign direct investment by M 
are sufficiently high so that the returns A to exporting exceed the net 
profits B-G of foreign direct investment, and if embargo threats are 
not perceived to be serious enough to reduce the expected value of A 
below B -  G and induce foreign direct investment. 
6.4  Conclusions 
The cases analyzed briefly in the previous section are not exhaustive, 
but they do illustrate various theoretical possibilities, and in particular 
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in the paper. The requirements for a successful embargo, in the absence 
of  effective  extraterritorial  control of  subsidiaries and licensees are 
quite demanding. Embargoes seem unlikely to succeed if  there has 
been diffusion of technological knowledge and independent production 
capability through multinationals either in response to market pressures 
or in response to perceived embargo threats; or  if the nation contem- 
plating the embargo has a reputation for the political use of trade re- 
strictions; or, finally, if  the acquisition of the requisite knowledge and 
capability by independent foreign firms is not prohibitively costly. The 
skepticism  of  the Western  European countries  and of  the Office of 
Technology Assessment may be well founded. 
References 
Bayard, Thomas, O., Joseph Pelzman, and Jorge Perez-Lopez. 1983. Stakes 
and risks in economic sanctions. The World Economy 61: 73-87. 
Becker, Abraham S.,  ed. 1983. Economic relations with the USSR.  Lexington, 
Mass.: Lexington Books. 
Cooper, Richard N. 1987. Trade policy as foreign policy.  U.S.  trade policies 
in  a changing  world economy, ed. Robert M. Stern, chap. 6. Cambridge, 
Mass.:  M.I.T.  Press. 
Daoudi, M. S., and M. S. Dajani.  1983. Economic sanctions: Ideals and ex- 
perience. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Dunning, John H. 1979. Exploring changing patterns of international  invest- 
ment: In defence of the eclectic theory. Oxford Bulletin of  Economics and 
Statistics 41: 269-96. 
Ethier, W. J. 1983. Modern internationaleconomics. New York: Norton, chap. 7. 
Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole.  1984. The fat-cat effect, the puppy-dog 
ploy, and the lean and hungry look. American Economic Review (papers and 
proceedings issue) 74: 361 -66. 
Guillaume, Jean-Marie. 1983. A European view of East-West trade in the 1980s. 
Chap. 6 of Becker (1983). 
Hanson, Philip.  1983. The role of trade and technology transfer in the Soviet 
economy. Chap. 3 of Becker (1983). 
Hirsch, Seev. 1976. An international trade and investment theory of the firm. 
Oxford Economic Papers 28: 258-70. 
Horstmann, Ignatius, and James R. Markusen. 1987. Strategic  investments and 
the development of multinationals. International Economic Review 28: 109- 
21. 
Office of Technology Assessment. 1983. Technology and East-West trade: An 
update. Washington, D.C.:  United States Congress. 
Rode, Reinhard, and  Hanns-D. Jacobsen, eds.  1985. Economic  warfare  or 
dktente:  An assessment of East-West economic relations in the 1980s. Boul- 
der: Westview Press. 
Smith, Alasdair.  1987. Strategic investment, multinational corporations, and 
trade policy. European Economic Review 31: 89-96. 170  Alasdair Smith 
Stent, Angela.  1981.  From embargo to Ostpolitik: The political economy  of 
West German-Soviet  relations, 1955-1980.  Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press. 
Vernon, Raymond. 1971. Sovereignty at bay: The multinational spread of  U,S. 
enterprises. New York: Basic Books. 
Comment  L. A. Winters 
These papers” are interesting and informative attempts on a difficult 
subject. Each comprises a historical-cum-political analysis followed by 
a simple model of the sort with which economists are used to working. 
While there are many similarities between the historical sections of the 
papers, the models are nicely complementary: Kierzkowski deals with 
the potentially embargoed country, while Smith deals mainly with the 
embargoing country and its firms. It is no disrespect to either author 
to note that their  models have a  very  long way  to go to match the 
subtlety of their historical analyses. Nonetheless most of my comments 
concern the former rather than the latter. 
In U.S.-European trade relations two aspects of embargoes are of 
interest: first the partners’ different attitudes towards embargoes on 
third countries, and second the possibilities of embargoes between the 
two. The former revolves around the concepts of linkage and leverage 
discussed  by  Smith. The distinction  between  these concepts is un- 
doubtedly interesting and fruitful, but I am not sure that it lies entirely 
in the realms of frustrated vs. fulfilled expectations. Both linkage and 
leverage involve the target country-the  USSR-paying  a price, i.e., 
doing something it  would  not otherwise do. Both  require the initial 
expectation that the West continue to deliver on its side of the bargain. 
Both require that Western promisedthreats to continue/curtail delivery 
are believed. Both are defined over the same pair of outcomes: either 
both the USSR and the West  “deliver,”  or neither does. It seems to 
me that the crucial distinction lies not in expectations but more in the 
process by which the “price”  is declared. Under linkage this is done 
quietly and implicitly,  under leverage overtly and explicitly. At least 
in the Jackson-Vanik case, leverage entailed the USSR’s  paying a higher 
price-it  added national humiliation to the price of  Jewish emigration. 
Not only was this unpalatable to the highest Soviet authorities, but it 
may also have upset subtle coalitions within the Soviet hierarchy, bring- 
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ing into the game new players who were excluded while it was being 
played on purely commercial grounds.’ 
Turning to the possibilities of U.S.-European embargoes, Smith’s 
conclusion that firms are likely to prefer foreign direct investment over 
exporting as a means of evading embargoes seems correct. It probably 
does not generalize to more extreme political situations, however. Both 
the possibility of retaliatory  nationalization of foreign assets, and the 
possibility  that the embargo or other pressure would bring the target 
country’s economy to its knees reduces the relative attractiveness of 
foreign direct investment. Thus, for example, I suspect that firms con- 
sidering supplying South Africa today would favor exporting, with its 
lower initial commitment, to direct investment. 
Kierzkowski argues convincingly that the case for restrictive trade 
policy based on the threat of future embargo is rather slight. Even so, 
I  believe his model tends to exaggerate it.  First, the case for policy 
requires that the perceived private costs of embargo fall short of the 
social costs. With the exception that governments might have better 
information  about future foreign policy  shocks, this seems unlikely. 
Second, his example of airliner  sales, in  which purchase involves a 
necessary commitment to foreign servicing, provides precisely the sort 
of circumstances in which leasing is an attractive alternative to  outright 
purchase. Under leasing  arrangements the purchaser at least avoids 
losing his capital expenditure in the event of an embargo. Third, the 
nonstorability of the embargoed good is not completely generalizable. 
Storage may be a cheaper response to the threat of embargo than is 
autarchy; certainly strategic stocks of several goods do exist. Fourth, 
the utility function in which U(0,y) = 0 means that no insurance against 
embargo is worthwhile. If higher y-consumption  did compensate for 
the loss of x,  countries might try to insure themselves on foreign in- 
surance markets,  although  it is  not guaranteed that such contracts 
would be honoured. More to  the point, however, if y were worth some- 
thing during the embargo, there would be more incentive to maximize 
the level of y-capacity prior to any embargo; that is, less incentive to 
sacrifice y-output for x-output by a policy of autarchy. 
1. See H. Raiffa, The Arr and Science ofNegotiation (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1982), on the negotiating penalties of  trying to  humiliate one’s opponent. This Page Intentionally Left Blank